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HOLLIE J. PAINE
Hospital merger mania is prevalent in our country.' Changes in
the health care industry, including increased competition, the crea-
tion of health maintenance organizations, and rising costs of health
care delivery, have induced hospitals to merge simply to stay alive.2 In
particular, Catholic hospitals have begun to merge with non-sectarian
hospitals at an alarming rate.' Since Catholic hospitals tend to be fi-
nancially stable,4 they are able to offer struggling non-sectarian hospi-
tals the much-needed financial resources to stay afloat. However, the
financial resources the Catholic hospitals provide come at a tremen-
dous cost.5 Most significantly, the Church6 guidelines that Catholic
1. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1093
(1996) (citing a hospital merger "boom" beginning in the 1980s).
2. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health
Care Market, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1429, 1430, 1432-34 (1995). See also MERGERWATCH, RELi-
GIous HOSPITAL MERGERS & HMOs: THE HIDDEN CRISIS FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE
10-11 (1997-98) (citing the impact of managed care, government budget cuts, changes to
hospital financing systems, overcapacity, the desire to reach suburban patients, and compe-
tition from for-profit hospitals as the "key economic factors forcing previously-competitive
hospitals to work together") (on file with JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & Poucy) [here-
inafter MERGERWATCH]. MergerWatch, funded by the Education Fund of the Family Plan-
ning Advocates of New York State, monitors sectarian/non-sectarian mergers and trains
and provides resources to communities opposing sectarian/non-sectarian mergers. See id.
at 3.
3. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1094 (citing fifty-seven Catholic mergers with non-
sectarian hospitals between 1990 and 1995). Furthermore, most Catholic hospitals are
considering a merger of some type. See id. at n.38 (citing Catholic Hospitals Struggle to Keep
Identity, 5 HEALTH CARE PR & MARKETING NEWS, Mar. 7, 1996). In particular, Catholic
Health Initiatives, a national Catholic health care organization, has targeted various cities
for mergers between Catholic and non-sectarian hospitals. See CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIA-
TIVES, CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES: A SPIRIT OF INNOVATION, A LEGACY OF CARE
(planning "growth strategy" in Baltimore, MD, Denver, CO, Nebraska, Iowa, Philadelphia,
PA, and the Delaware Valley) (pamphlet on file with author). Another large Catholic
health care organization, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW), "leads the recent 'merger
mania,' with at least thirty-five hospitals in California, Arizona and Nevada." Lawrence E.
Singer, Realigning Catholic Health Care: Bridging Legal and Church Control in a Consolidating
Market, 72 TUL. L. REv. 159, 177 (1997).
4. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1092 (citing CATHOLICS FOR FREE CHOICE, HEALTH
CARE LIMITED: CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (rev. ed.
1995)). Although Catholic hospitals are non-profit, they generate substantial gross reve-
nue and gross income. See id.
5. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
6. I simply use "Church" to refer to the Catholic Church as an institution. I do not
intend it to signify the Catholic Church as the only or best type of church or religion.
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hospitals force non-sectarian hospitals to comply with upon merger
often result in the loss of patients' rights to obtain and refuse numer-
ous services.7
This paper explores the cost hospitals, communities, and patients
will pay when Catholic hospitals merge with non-sectarian hospitals.
In particular, this paper focuses on the post-merger elimination of pa-
tients' rights to create end-of-life directives and refuse unwanted med-
ical treatment. Due to a heavy focus on the loss of reproductive
services which often result from Catholic mergers, end-of-life issues
have not been adequately addressed. This paper, although narrow in
scope, attempts to bring end-of-life issues to the forefront of the Cath-
olic/non-sectarian merger discussion.
Part I of this paper describes the Catholic health care system and
explains the details of Catholic mergers. In particular, Part I explains
the Catholic guidelines that non-sectarian hospitals are frequently
forced to follow post-merger. Compliance with these guidelines could
eliminate patients' rights to create advance directives and refuse un-
wanted treatments.' Catholic doctrine and Church activity regarding
artificial nutrition and hydration are explored in Part II. Part II illus-
trates that Catholic hospitals, despite protestations and promises to
the contrary, will most likely refuse to honor patients' advance direc-
tives and decisions to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Part III ex-
amines patients' rights to refuse medical treatment, specifically
artificial nutrition and hydration, and to create advance directives.
Moreover, Part III examines providers' conscience clause rights to ob-
ject to patients' requests to withdraw or withhold artificial nutrition
and hydration on religious grounds. Most importantly, Part III illus-
trates the danger of allowing merged-facilities to maintain policies
that conflict with patients' rights to create advance directives and re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment.
PART I. CATHOLIC HrLHI CARE AND THE MERGER MANIA SCENE
Catholic health care institutions deliver the largest portion of pri-
vate sector care in the United States.9 Moreover, Catholic health care
institutions have expressed a strong commitment to providing health
7. See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
8. See infta notes 9-47 and accompanying text.
9. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1090. Additionally, Catholic health care facilities,
taken as a whole, "comprise the single largest provider of institutional health care in the
country." Singer, supra note 3, at 167.
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care to the poor,"° including both Medicaid recipients and those pa-
tients who cannot pay.11 Most importantly, Catholic health care' 2 is
strongly committed to protecting and promoting Catholic values in
the health care it provides." The commitment to Church doctrine
primarily shapes the delivery of Catholic health care. 4
All Catholic hospitals and "affiliated physicians" are bound to ad-
here to the "Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services" (ERDs) set forth by the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops.15 The ERDs fulfill a "two-fold [purpose]: first, to reaffirm the
ethical standards of behavior in health. care that flow from the
Church's teaching about the dignity of the human person; second, to
provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that face Cath-
olic health care today."1 6 To effectuate this purpose, the ERDs man-
date certain rules Catholic health care institutions must abide by in
order to avoid scandal 17 and to maintain the "distinctive Catholic
identity of the Church's institutional health care services."18
10. See Liz Bucar, When Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals Merge, 19 CONSCIENCE 3, 3
(1998). But see Charles J. Milligan, Jr., Provisions of Uncompensated Care in American Hospi-
tals: The Role of the Tax Code, the Federal Courts, Catholic Health Care Facilities, and Local Govern-
ments in Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor, 31 CATH. LAW. 7, 28 (1987) ("Catholic
hospitals... have in recent years vastly neglected indigent care."). In reality, only 3.1% of
Catholic health care's net patient revenue is dedicated to charity care. See Deanna Bellandi
& Bruce Jaspen, While You Weren't Sleeping: Not-For-Profit Growth Keeps Investor-Owned Systems
up at Night According to 1998 Multi-Unit Providers Survey, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 25, 1998,
at 35.
11. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1091.
12. The provision of Catholic health care is centered around the Catholic faith:
The mystery of Christ casts light on every facet of Catholic health care: to see
Christian love as the animating principle of health care: to see healing and com-
passion as a continuation of Christ's mission: to see suffering as a participation in
the redemptive power of Christ's passion, death, and resurrection: and to see
death, transformed by the resurrections, as an opportunity for a final act of com-
munion with Christ.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BisHops, ETHICAL AND RELiGious DIRECrIVES FOR
CATHoLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 3 (1995) [hereinafter ERDs].
Neither the author nor this paper advocates Catholicism as the only or best religion or
the Catholic conception of its god as the only or best conception.
13. See Boozang, supra note 2, at 1439 (citing a "desire to preserve Catholic identity of
the Church's health care facilities").
14. See Bucar, supra note 10, at 6. "As opposed to most other health care sectors, Cath-
olic health care is specifically linked to a ministry." Singer, supra note 3, at 209.
15. Boozang, supra note 2, at 1439; Bucar, supra note 10, at 6.
16. ERDs, supra note 12, at 1.
17. See id. at 26-27. The ERDs describe an example of scandal as "generating a confu-
sion about Catholic moral teaching." Id. at 27.
18. Id. at 1. See also infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text (describing the permissive
nature of the ERDs and the consequences of non-compliance). However, many scholars
believe that the Catholic health care mission should not override patient's health care
rights. See, e.g., Bucar, supra note 10, at 4 (The Catholic health care mission "should not be
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In particular, the ERDs prohibit Catholic health care institutions
from performing or providing certain services and procedures.19
Most obviously, the ERDs prohibit the provision of abortions at Catho-
lic hospitals.2" Closely related and equally as problematic, the ERDs
overstated or used to justify Catholic hospitals' denial of basic reproductive health
services.").
19. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
20. See ERDs, supra note 12, at 19. ERD 45 provides that "abortion (that is, the directly
intended termination of pregnancy before viability or the directly intended destruction of
a viable fetus) is never permitted." Id. (emphasis added). "Catholic health care institutions
need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in any association with abortion provid-
ers." Id. The ERDs' prohibition on the provision of abortion and other reproductive
health services has heretofore been the primary focus of the Catholic/non-sectarian
merger debate. See for example: Bucar, supra note 10; Ikemoto, supra note 1; Janet Gal-
lagher, Religious Freedom, Reproductive Health Care, and Hospital Mergers, 52 J. AM. MED. Wo-
MEN'S ASS'N 65 (1997); Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their
Effects on Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REv. 945 (1996).
Federal and state law does allow providers, including Catholic ones, the right not to
provide or perform abortions. See infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, women have a fundamental, although not absolute right, to abortion. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). When the state has a compelling interest, it may regulate
against a women's right to abortion after viability except when the life or health of the
mother is at risk. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). However, federal
and state conscience clause rights allow Catholic hospitals to ignore women's rights to
abortion under Casey and Roe even when the life or health of the mother is at risk. See infra
notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
However, when a Catholic hospital has merged with a non-sectarian one, the merged
facility should not have the same conscience clause rights. Although a full religious free-
dom analysis is outside the scope of this paper, it appears that conscience clause rights in
the sectarian/non-sectarian merger context should be limited because the merger reduces
the treatment options for patients. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1104. " [W] hen all or most
of a health care market becomes dominated by a provider with restrictive religious rules,
patients are in danger of losing their access to a full range of health services."
MERGERWATCH, supra note 2, at 15. See also infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
Dr. Wayne Goldner, a physician in Manchester, New Hampshire, has experienced the
limitation of options sectarian/non-sectarian merger creates. See Democracy Now: A Threat to
Women's Choice in This Country (Pacifica Radio radio broadcast, May 26, 1998) (transcript on
file with JoURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & PoLIcy) [hereinafter A Threat to Women's Choice].
"Kathleen," one of Dr. Goldner's patients, "want[s] to have a healthy baby" but has lost two
pregnancies. Id. at 1-2, 7. During the second pregnancy, "Kathleen's" water broke at four-
teen weeks; as a result, the fetus had a two percent chance of survival, and there was a high
possibility that "Kathleen" would become infected. See id. at 2. Dr. Goldner's hospital had
recently merged with a Catholic one; therefore, when he determined that "Kathleen"
needed an abortion, he consulted the merged administration about "the new guidelines"
his hospital had been required to follow upon merger. Id. at 2. The administration told
him he could not perform the abortion. See id. Dr. Goldner was adamant that "Kathleen's"
request for an abortion be honored. See id. He called the vice president of the hospital
and requested permission to perform the procedure; he "basically threatened [Dr. Gold-
ner] and said, 'I'll pull your privileges if you do this.'" Id. The administration asked Dr.
Goldner "to change [his] diagnosis, [to consult] an emergency ethics committee, [and to
have "Kathleen"] reexamined to see if they could get a different diagnosis." Id. at 5.
Finally,
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prohibit all forms of contraceptive services including both male and
female sterilizations.2 ' Furthermore, Catholic institutions may not
provide fertility treatments or procedures.2 2 Finally, and most impor-
Kathleen alone, got into a cab with a person she didn't know, [traveled] 80 miles,
where she then had to wait five hours to be seen by a physician .... who she did
not know who did a termination on her of a pregnancy she desperately would
have loved to have, who then traveled back alone in a cab, on a Friday night, and
got home at 10:30 at night.
Id. Lois Utdey, director of MergerWatch, described "Kathleen's" case as "probably the
most shocking example [she has] seen nationally of how church dogma is being allowed to
interfere with a physician's ability to care for his patients." Id. at 3.
Although the ERDs prohibit Catholic health care institutions from providing abor-
tions, Catholic institutions are permitted, under ERD 46, to provide "compassionate physi-
cal, psychological, moral, and spiritual care to those persons who have suffered from the
trauma of abortion." ERDs, supra note 12, at 19.
21. "Catholic health institutions may not promote or condone contraceptive practices
but should provide, for married couples .... instruction both about the Church's teaching on
responsible parenthood and in methods of natural family planning." ERDs, supra note 12,
at 20 (ERD 52). "Direct sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or tem-
porary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care institution when its sole immediate effect
is to prevent conception." Id. (ERD 53). In other words, natural family planning, more
commonly known as the rhythm method, is the only contraception method Catholic insti-
tutions can discuss, and they may only discuss it with married couples.
Emergency contraception can not be provided to victims of rape and sexual assault
under the ERDs unless it is clear that conception has not occurred. See id. (ERD 36). "If
... there is no evidence that conception has occurred already, [a rape or sexual assault
victim] may be treated with medications that would prevent ovulation, sperm capacitation,
or fertilization." Id. "It is not permissible, however, to initiate or recommend treatments
[(like the morning after pill)] that have as their purpose or direct effect the removal,
destruction, or interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum." Id. (citing Penn-
sylvania Catholic Conference, Guidelines for Catholic Hospitals Treating Victims of Sexual As-
sault, 22 OPJGINs 810 (1993)).
22. Generally, fertility treatments that interfere with the marital act are prohibited, but
those that do not are permitted. For example,
heterologous fertilization (that is, any technique used to achieve conception by
the use of gametes coming from at least one donor other than the spouses [e.g.,
an egg donor or a sperm donor]) is prohibited because it is contrary to the cove-
nant of marriage, the unity of the spouses, and the dignity proper to parents and
the child.
ERDs, supra note 12, at 18-19 (ERD 40). Furthermore, surrogate motherhood is expressly
prohibited by ERD 42 because it interferes with the "uniqueness of the mother-child rela-
tionship." Id. at 19. Similarly, "homologous artificial fertilization (that is, any technique
used to achieve conception using the gametes of the two spouses joined in marriage) is
prohibited when it separates procreation from the marital act." Id. at 19 (ERD 41). In
other words, all types of fertility treatment that separate conception from the marital act of
sexual intercourse are prohibited by the ERDs.
The ERDs do provide that a fertility treatment which "does not substitute for the mari-
tal act itself may be used to help married couples conceive." Id. at 18 (ERD 38). These
techniques are only permitted, however, when they "do not involve the destruction of
human embryos, or their deliberate generation in such numbers that it is clearly envisaged
that all cannot implant and some are simply being used to maximize the chances of others
implanting." Id. at 18 (ERD 39). The ERDs do not describe or list fertility treatments that
do not interfere with the marital act.
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tantly for this paper, the ERDs prohibit Catholic health care institu-
tions from honoring patient end-of-life directives, including requests
to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration for exam-
ple, which are in conflict with Catholic teaching. 23 Despite this elimi-
nation of patients' rights to create advance directives, 24 "Catholic
health care does not offend the rights of individual conscience by re-
fusing to provide or permit medical procedures that are judged mor-
ally wrong by the teaching authority of the Church."2 5
Catholic hospitals sometimes contemplate merging with non-sec-
tarian hospitals. 26 The impetus behind Catholic mergers with non-
sectarian hospitals is unclear. One explanation is financial; Catholic
hospitals, like most other hospitals, are struggling to maintain re-
sources and deliver services in a changing health care market.
27
23. See id. at 14. "[A Catholic health care] institution . . .will not honor an advance
directive that is contrary to Catholic teaching." Id. (ERD 24). See also infra notes 92-187
and accompanying text (describing Catholic treatment of artificial nutrition and hydration
and speculating that merged facilities will not honor patients' advance directives to with-
draw or withhold artificial nutrition and hydration). End-of-life directives are more com-
monly known as advance directives;
[a]n advance directive is a written statement that is intended to govern health
care decision-making for its author, should he or she lose decisional capacity in
the future. Though by this definition advance directives can apply to any health
care decision, they are almost always addressed to end-of-life issues, and it is in
this context that they are best known. As 'living wills' (directives giving lists of
instructions), 'health care proxies' (durable powers of attorney naming proxy de-
cision-makers, or agents, for health-related decision-making), or both, advance
directives are becoming commonplace.
NANcy M.P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANcE DitcrlvEs 2 (1996) (citation omitted).
24. Patients have a "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment." Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). See also infra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text. In almost every state, patients have rights to create
advance directives and appoint agents or proxies to make health care decisions for them in
the event that they later become incompetent. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying
text.
25. ERDs, supra note 12, at 7. But see infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
26. See A Threat to Women's Choice, supra note 20, at 4 ("'There is... an increasing trend
toward Catholic systems acquiring or attempting to merge or affiliate with secular, non-
profit, community hospitals .... ) (quoting Lois Uttley, director of MergerWatch).
27. See Boozang, supra note 2, at 1434 ("[Catholic with non-sectarian] mergers are fre-
quently pursued because neither facility can continue to maintain the financial or techno-
logical resources necessary to exist independently . . . ."). See also supra note 2 and
accompanying text (describing changes in the health care market). Even though Catholic
hospitals, like other hospitals, may choose to merge because of business opportunity or
business necessity, "[w]hat distinguishes many of the transactions occurring in Catholic
health care from these types of traditional business decisions.., is that much of the activity
is driven by the Church's need to coalesce control of its ministry." Singer, supra note 3, at
161. In reality, Catholic hospitals most likely choose to merge for both financial and reli-
gious reasons. Cf id. at 175 (identifying "concerted efforts [by Catholic health care institu-
tions] to protect both the market viability and the Catholic identity of their institutions").
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Whatever the reason, when a Catholic hospital seeks to merge with a
non-sectarian one, the merger agreement and its terms are almost al-
ways kept secret until after the merger is announced to the public.2 8
Although the terms of a Catholic/non-sectarian merger are gen-
erally kept secret from the community in which the merger is pro-
posed,2 9 the Church does have a decision-making structure for
approving such mergers.3" First, for "the 'alienation' of any church
property valued at more than $3 million," the local bishop must be
consulted and permission must be obtained from the Vatican. 1
Although approval by the local bishop is required for every merger,3 2
the bishops vary in their method and manner of approval.33
In approving a merger, the local bishop must interpret the ERDs
that prohibit all Catholic health care institutions from providing serv-
In addition to financial necessity, Prof. Boozang suggests that Catholic hospitals may
be motivated to seek mergers with non-sectarian hospitals "by the perception that refusal
by Catholic hospitals to provide religiously prohibited services adversely affects their mar-
ketability. Thus, religious providers seek to combine with secular entities whose services
will supplement those prohibited by Catholic doctrine." Boozang, supra note 2, at 1434
(citing HowardJ. Anderson, Catholic Hospitals Join Forces with Non-Catholic Competitors, HosPi-
TALS, Oct. 20, 1990, at 44).
Despite Prof. Boozang's argument, MergerWatch and communities that have fought
the restrictive terms of Catholic with non-sectarian mergers have found that Catholic insti-
tutions do not seek these mergers to augment their provided services. On the contrary,
Catholic institutions almost always require the sectarian hospital to comply with the ERDs
that prohibit these services. See A Threat to Women's Choice, supra note 20, at 4 (quoting Lois
Uttley, director of MergerWatch) ("'When these affiliations take place, typically the reli-
gious authorities, those representing the religiously affiliated hospital, will come to the
negotiating table with a set of non-negotiable demands and insist that the secular hospitals
ban all or some . . . reproductive health services and start following religious rules.'").
28. See MERGERWATCH, supra note 2, at 6 ("Secretly, in meetings behind closed doors,
hospital and HMO executives across the United States are negotiating away their patients'
access to reproductive health care."); Bucar, supra note 10, at 4 ("[T]he preliminaries to a
merger go on behind closed doors... ."). See also Milligan,Jr., supra note 10, at 28 ("[T]he
internal workings of Catholic hospitals, like other Catholic institutions are deliberately hid-
den from public view.").
29. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Craig Timberg, Allegany
Hospital Merger May End: Cumberland Divided on Union of Catholic, Secular Facilities, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 5, 1998, at Al.
30. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1097-1102 (describing the Church's decision-making
structure for approving mergers).
31. See Bucar, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Bishop John Meyers, The Ins and Outs of Hospi-
tals Mergers: How Canon Law Watches over Vital Interests, NAT'L CATH. REG., Jan. 1997, at 5).
32. See ERDs, supra note 12, at 26 (ERD 68) ("The diocesan bishop's approval is re-
quired for partnerships sponsored by institutions subject to his governing authority.").
ERD 68 "give[s] the local bishop veto power over any Catholic hospital merger by requir-
ing his approval to close the deal." Bucar, supra note 10, at 6.
33. See Boozang, supra note 2, at 1435.
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ices in conflict with the Church's teachings. 4 Apparently, however, a
particular bishop may decide not to follow certain ERDs.35 As a result,
some bishops may allow the merged facility to provide services banned
by the ERDs, and some bishops may follow the ERDs' "ban on certain
services to the secular facility. ' 36 While a given bishop may decide not
to follow a particular ERD, a certain amount of pressure from the Vati-
can may force him to do so.
7
Although the ERDs arguably purport to give bishops discretion in
following the ERDs, the Pope has warned that if certain ERDs are not
followed, specifically those prohibiting reproductive health services,
Catholic hospitals may lose their Catholic sponsorship.38 Moreover,
under Church law local bishops are not only "empowered to
strengthen and promote institutional catholicity and greater Catholic
health care, they are commanded to do so." 9 In addition to Church
pressure, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) is
"urging bishops to assert themselves more aggressively in the health
care ministry.'"40
Arguably, bishops are also receiving indirect pressure from NCCB
to adopt the ERDs. Recently, NCCB published "Living the Gospel of
Life," proclaiming that Catholic politicians who oppose abortion but
vote pro-choice "cannot be considered faithful members of the
church."4 ' NCCB's "Living Gospel of Life" urged these Catholic offi-
cials "'to consider the consequences for their own spiritual well-being,
as well as the scandal they risk by leading others into serious sin."' 42
34. See ERDs, supra note 12, at 26-27 (explaining that ERDs 67 through 70 provide
guidelines for bishops to interpret the ERDs so as to avoid scandal in mergers). See also
supra note 17 (providing the ERDs' definition of scandal).
35. See Ikemoto, supra note 1, at 1100 ("[E]ach bishop has a great deal of influence
over how a hospital will follow the [ERDs]."). Apparently, the ERDs are permissive rather
than mandatory; this is evidenced by the use of "should" and "may" in ERDs 67 through 70.
See also supra note 34 (providing ERDs' description of its provisions as "guidelines").
36. Boozang, supra note 2, at 1435.
37. See Bucar, supra note 10, at 8.
38. See id. (discussing the Vatican's Evangelium Vitae of 1995).
39. Singer, supra note 3, at 226.
40. Id. at 212.
41. John Rivera, Bishops Warn Elected Catholics, BALT. SUN, Nov. 19, 1998, at Al (citing
NAT'L CONFERENCE CATHOLIC BISHOPS, LIVING THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: A CHALLENGE TO AMERI-
CAN CATHOLICS (1998) [hereinafter LIVING THE GOSPEL OF LIFE]).
42. Id. (quoting LIVING THE GOSPEL OF LIFE). Local bishops have already begun acting
upon "Living the Gospel of Life." In fact, Bishop Donald Trautman of Erie, Pennsylvania
has "declared that politicians such as [Pennsylvania's Governor Ridge]-a Catholic from
Erie-[would be] unwelcome to speak at Catholic-sponsored events." Ron Goldwyn, Pro-
choice Views Barred at Catholic Events, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21, 1998, at 3. Gover-
nor Ridge "has begun turning down Catholic invitations" so as not to violate his bishop's
instructions. Id.
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Given that NCCB has taken to threatening public officials who
are not faithful to Church teaching, it is most likely that the majority
of American bishops (represented by NCCB) would feel uncomforta-
ble allowing services, reproductive or otherwise," at a merged facility
in their jurisdiction that violated the ERDs and Church teaching. If
bishops are banning politicians from speaking at Catholic events, it is
highly likely that they will ban the provision of services at hospitals.
Whether the Church or NCCB pressures bishops to follow the
ERDs or not, pro-merger advocates argue that a bishop may interpret
the ERDs as he sees fit.4 4 As a result of this discretion, the compliance
a non-sectarian hospital will be forced to make upon merger with a
Catholic hospital will depend on the interpretation of the bishop in
that jurisdiction.4 5 However, in reality, non-sectarian hospitals are
usually requested to comply with the at least some of the ERDs upon
merger with a Catholic hospital4 6 unless an alternative arrangement
can be created.4 7 If an alternative arrangement cannot be made and
43. NCCB most likely will not stop with attacking reproductive health care. The history
of NCCB and Catholic statements and activities regarding the withholding or withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration suggest that end-of-life directives are next. See infra notes
71-90 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (providing suggestions of ERDs as
discretionary).
45. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46. See MERGERWATCH, supra note 2, at 7.
47. See id. at 21 ("Through these creative solutions, religious beliefs are respected at
religious-sponsored hospitals, but are not imposed on the health care delivered at nonsec-
tarian hospitals."). Sometimes merging hospitals can create an alternative solution to
merger that allows the non-Catholic hospital to continue the provision of services that are
prohibited by the ERDs. See id. at 19-21 (providing examples of creative solutions). For
example,
two religiously-based hospital networks in Texas, one of which includes a Catholic
medical center, are preparing ajoint operating agreement that would respect the
ethical views of each denomination represented. One religious view will not be
forced on all partners as a condition of the agreement, and all partners will be
able to continue to provide medical care in line with their own beliefs ...
Under the arrangement, the partners would maintain control over their own as-
sets, while combining some operations, including purchasing.
MergerWatch, Creative Solutions:Joint Operating Agreement Between Two Texas Hospital Networks
Will Maintain Reproductive Services (last modified Sep. 11, 1998) <http://www.fpaofnys.org/
MergerWatch/cresolu.html>. However, "whether the Church hierarchy will consider these
alternatives sufficiently faithful to its directives depends largely upon the bishops' applica-
tion of the Christian ethical concept of 'material cooperation' to the hospitals' activities."
Boozang, supra note 2, at 1440 (discussing alternatives which allow sterilizations for non-
contraceptive reasons specifically).
The doctrine of "material cooperation" is extremely difficult to describe. The ERDs
distinguish between "formal," "implicit formal," and "material cooperation." ERDs, supra
note 12, at 29.
If the cooperator intends the object of the wrongdoer's activity, then the coopera-
tion is formal, and therefore, morally wrong. ... Implicit formal cooperation is
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the local bishop decides to prohibit a service under the ERDs, pa-
tients' rights to-obtain and refuse services will likely be eliminated
post-merger.
In sum, many non-sectarian hospitals have been forced to follow
the ERDs upon merger.48 Although we know the effect sectarian/
non-sectarian merger can and has had on reproductive health care
services, 49 the question of what effect merger will have on patients'
rights to refuse unwanted medical treatment and create advance di-
rectives remains unanswered. An argument that these patient rights
will be preserved in some cases because a particular bishop may choose
not to honor ERD 24 which prohibits Catholic hospitals from honor-
ing advance directives in conflict with Catholic teaching5 ° does not
fully answer the question. In order to answer the question, Part II
surveys Church teaching and bishop activity on issues of artificial nu-
trition and hydration to determine the most likely merger response to
ERD 24.
PART II. PATIENT DIRECTIvEs AND ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND
HYDRATION (ANH) -WHAT WILL REALLJY HAPPEN WHEN CATHOLIC
AND NON-SECTARIAN HosPIrALs MERGE?
Most likely, local bishops will follow ERD 24 and deny patients
their rights to refuse unwanted medical treatment and create advance
attributed when, even though the cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer's
object, no other explanation can distinguish the cooperator's object from the
wrongdoer's object. If the cooperator does not intend the object of the wrong-
doer's activity, the cooperation is material and can be morally licit. ... When the
object of the cooperator's action remains distinguishable from that of the wrong-
doer's, material cooperation is mediate and can be morally licit.
Id. Even though material cooperation may not be immoral, the ERDs suggest measures to
avoid scandal in morally licit cooperation. "First, the object of material cooperation should
be as distant as possible from the wrongdoer's act. Second, any act of material cooperation
requires a proportionately grave reason." Id.
What "material cooperation" means then is anyone's guess. Commentators rarely de-
scribe it. But see Boozang, supra note 2, at 1440 (providing a marginal discussion of mate-
rial cooperation). It seems likely that morally licit material cooperation would not, be
overcome by the creative solutions anyway. First, since it is not clear whether spatial or
management "distance" is required for morally licit material cooperation, ajoint operating
agreement may not satisfy the "distance" consideration since the activities of the two hospi-
tals would be governed by one agreement. Secondly, what constitutes a "proportionately
grave reason" is unclear; financial need may not constitute such a reason.
48. See supra note 27 and infra, note 50 and accompanying text.
49. The effect merger may have on reproductive health care services has been well
discussed. See generally, Bucar, supra note 10; Ikemoto, supra note 1; Gallagher, supra note
20. The effect merger currently has on reproductive health services is being tracked by
MergerWatch. See generally, MERGERWATCH, supra note 2.
50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing ERD 24).
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directives. However, the argument that some bishops may not follow
ERD 24 looms ominously. First, although some Catholic commenta-
tors contend that Catholic teaching does not require ANH to be pro-
vided in every circumstance, a close analysis suggests that Catholic
teaching requires the provision of ANH in nearly every circumstance. 1
Secondly, an examination of Catholic and bishop activity and state-
ments regarding the withholding or withdrawal of ANH suggests that
most bishops will follow ERD 24 and disregard patients' rights to re-
fuse ANH, to have ANH withdrawn, or to direct that ANH be withheld
or withdrawn when they become incompetent.52
A. Catholic teaching on the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
medical treatment
First, "there is presently a conflict among Catholic authorities and
theologians over the morality of allowing a patient to forego artificial
nutrition and hydration."5 " Traditionally, Catholic theology has ap-
plied an extraordinary versus ordinary means test to determine
whether life-sustaining treatment should be.withheld or withdrawn. 4
However, some Catholic theologians have begun to use a useless ver-
sus not useless test for determining when life-sustaining treatment
should be withheld or withdrawn.55 Both tests are ambiguous and
neither definitively determines when and in what circumstances ANH
may be withheld or withdrawn.
1. The traditional extraordinary versus ordinary means test
Under the traditional test, "'ordinary means' are those which are
effective and can be employed without undue burden. 'Extraordinary
means' are those which either are futile or whose use involves too
grave a burden."5 6 Accordingly, under this traditional test, extraordi-
51. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
53. Peter J. Ausili, Withholding or Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration from Ter-
minally Ill and Permanently Unconscious Patients: Some Recent Case Law and Contemporary Catho-
lic Theology, 32 CATH. LAw. 55, 81 (1988).
54. See id at 78. Catholic ethicists "date the use of the terms ordinary or extraordinary
to the 17' century and stress that the terms make ethical .... rather than medical, distinc-
tions." Ginny Cunningham, Science Hasn't Made it Any Easier to Die; Today Advanced Medical
Technologies Can Compound Suffering in Ways that Earlier Generations Were Spared, U.S. CATH.,
Jul. 1, 1996, at 19.
55. See, e.g., MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, A PASTORAL LETTER: CARE OF THE SICK
AND DYING 1 (1993).
56. Moria M. Mcqueen and James L. Walsh, The House of Lords and the Discontinuation of
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: An Ethical Analysis of the Tony Bland Case, 35 CATH. LAW.
363, 373 (1994).
1999]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw & POLiCY
nary means are "morally optional" while ordinary means are "morally
obligatory.,5 7 The traditional test provides that "life-sustaining meas-
ures may be withheld or withdrawn when morally justified." 8
Under the traditional test, it is unclear whether ANH is extraordi-
nary, ordinary, morally optional, or morally obligatory and when with-
holding or withdrawing ANH becomes morally justified. In fact, one
Catholic commentator advocates that the traditional test should no
longer be used because it has not allowed "a systematic categorization
of typical medical treatments by Catholic theologians, particularly be-
cause of rapid advances in medical technology."59 In the Catholic/
non-sectarian merger context, the inability to identify whether ANH is
morally optional, in which case it could be withdrawn if morally justi-
fied, or morally obligatory under the traditional extraordinary versus
ordinary test is problematic. Quite possibly, Catholic hospital admin-
istrators and bishops could hide behind the ambiguity of the test
rather than take a specific position on the provision of ANH and ERD
24.
2. The useless versus not useless test
On the other side of the Catholic conflict over ANH, some Catho-
lic theologians use a useless versus not useless test to determine
whether life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn or withheld.6"
"A medical treatment is 'useless' to a particular patient if it cannot
bring about the effect for which it is designed."6" A health care pro-
vider should not administer a useless treatment because to do so
would be "both ineffective and inappropriate."6 2 Conversely, a not
useless medical treatment would bring about the effect for which it is
designed.63 A health care provider should not consider a treatment
useless simply because it "fails to achieve some goal beyond what
should be reasonably expected."64
To determine whether ANH is a useless or not useless medical
treatment, health care providers must determine whether it can
57. Asuili, supra note 53, at 78.
58. Id.
59. Id. "It is now recognized ...by ethicists as well as the medical community and
courts that the right to accept or refuse treatment is not dependent on the description of
medical procedures as 'ordinary' or 'extraordinary' . .. because these are legally indistin-
guishable." ARTHUR S. BERGER, WHEN LIFE ENDS: LEGAL OVERVIEWS, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS,
AND HOSPITAL POLICIES 26 (1995).
60. See, e.g., MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 55, at 8-10.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Cf id. (inferring "not useless" from "useless" as defined).
64. Id.
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achieve the "reasonably expected" effect for which it was designed.6"
With ANH, the "reasonably expected" portion of the test is key to de-
termining whether it should be administered:
a feeding tube is used to provide nutrients to a patient no
longer capable of eating; the tube is useful when it delivers
these nutrients to the patient who, in turn, absorbs them. It
is useless if the patient becomes incapable of absorbing the
nutrients the tube delivers. Moreover, a feeding tube should
not be described as useless if the nutrients it provides are
unable to cure an underlying pathology; the feeding tube
should not be expected to restore the patient to conscious-
ness or to remove any other debility not related to the need
for nutrients.66
Following this reasoning, ANH would almost never be removed be-
cause it could only be deemed useless if the patient were not able to
absorb the nutrients.
The useless versus not useless construction of ANH is extremely
troublesome in the Catholic/non-sectarian merger context. Since
ANH would almost never be deemed useless, advance directives to the
contrary would not be followed because they would conflict with Cath-
olic teaching.67 Even more troubling is the nondescript and ambigu-
ous manner in which the test is described. 68 As with the extraordinary
versus ordinary test, Catholic hospital administrators and bishops
could hide behind the ambiguous language of the test rather than
take a position on ERD 24.
The ambiguity problems the useless versus not useless test could
create in the merger context is compounded by the physician-cen-
tered approach of the test.69 Catholic health care officials could ar-
gue that a patient's advance directive requiring the withholding or
withdrawal of ANH may be honored because the bishop in that pa-
tient's jurisdiction may choose not to follow ERD 24.70 However, if
patients must rely on physicians to determine whether ANH is useless
65. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (setting forth the useless v. not useless
test for determining whether medical treatment should be administered).
66. MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 55, at 8-9.
67. See ERDs, supra note 12, at 14 (ERD 24).
68. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (describing the useless v. not useless
test as applied to ANH).
69. See MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 55, at 9 ("Patients and their loved
ones need to rely on health care professionals who can help them decide which forms of
treatment are effective and, thus useful, and those which are ineffective and, thus,
useless.").
70. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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or not and Catholic teaching provides that ANH is virtually never use-
less, Catholic hospital policy would supercede a physician's recom-
mendations. Therefore, patients' advance directives would not be
effectuated.
B. Catholic and bishop activities and statements regarding ANH
The argument that advance directives requiring that ANH be
withheld or withdrawn may be honored because a particular bishop
may choose not to follow ERD 24 becomes suspect upon examination
of Catholic and bishop activities and statements regarding ANH.
First, Catholic organizations have submitted amicus curiae briefs
against withdrawing or withholding ANH in several ANH cases. 71 Sec-
ondly, Catholic organizations and bishops have opposed state and fed-
eral legislation that gives patients the right to decide for themselves.7 2
Finally, and most convincingly, NCCB has publicly expounded a pro-
ANH position. v
1. Catholic amicus briefs against withholding or withdrawing ANH
First, Catholic organizations have petitioned the courts amicus cu-
riae advocating for the provision of ANH when patients requested that
it be withdrawn.7 ' For example, in Cruzan v. Missouri Health Depart-
ment,75 both the Catholic Lawyers Guild of the Archdiocese of Boston
and the United Catholic Conference submitted briefs amicus curiae
against withdrawing Nancy Cruzan's ANH.7 6 State Catholic organiza-
tions have entered amicus briefs in several state ANH cases as well.77
These amicus briefs suggest Catholic opposition to withdrawing or
withholding ANH.
Although Catholics appear to be opposed to the withdrawal or
withholding of ANH, other religious groups appear not to be. For
example, in Cruzan, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and
the General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist
Church submitted amicus curiae advocating withdrawal of Cruzan's
71. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Health Dep't, 497 U.S. 261, 264 (1990); In reJobes, 529 A.2d
434, 436 (N.J. 1987); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976).
75. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
76. See id. at 264.
77. See, e.g., Jobes, 529 A.2d at 436 (New Jersey Catholic Conference submitted amicus
curiae against withdrawal); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651 (New Jersey Catholic Conference sub-
mitted amicus curiae against withdrawal).
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ANH.78 Since all religions do not advocate identical positions on the
withdrawal or withholding of ANH, a Catholic/non-sectarian merger
would likely circumvent the religious choice of non-Catholic patients
in the area served by the merged facility.79
2. Catholic and bishop opposition to federal and state patients'
rights legislation
Catholic organizations and bishops have also opposed federal
and state legislation purporting to give patients the rights to make
advance directives, appoint surrogate decision makers, and make end-
of-life decisions for themselves.8" For example, the United States
Catholic Conference originally opposed the Patient Self-Determina-
tion Act which requires hospitals that receive federal funding to in-
form patients of state law and hospital policy regarding advance
directives.81 Similarly, the Maryland Conference of Catholic Bishops
opposed certain portions of the proposed Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act (MHCDA) which sought to give patients the rights to create
advance directives and appoint an agent to make health care decisions
78. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 264. Several other religions either do not oppose ANH
withdrawal or withholding or oppose them for reasons other than the Catholic Church's
reasons. See Caryle Murphy, When Is It Time to Die? Faiths, Families Weigh End-of-Life Issues,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1998, at Cl. For example, the Seventh-day Adventist, Episcopal, Lu-
theran Church-Missouri Synod, Southern Baptist, and Islamic faiths generally allow the
withdrawal of ANH with varying restrictions. See id.
79. See infta notes 96-187 (suggesting that ERD compliance in a Catholic/non-sectarian
merger circumvents the religious freedom of non-Catholics).
80. See infra notes 81-86.
81. See Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History
and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249, 255 (1997)
(discussing the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 4206, 4751 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.)). Under PSDA, all health care facilities that receive federal monies, like Medicaid,
are required to "maintain written policies and procedures with respect to all adult individu-
als receiving medical care by or through the provider or organization." PSDA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(w) (1) (1991). In addition, the facility must "provide written information to each
adult individual concerning [the patient's] rights under State law" about surrogate deci-
sion-making and advance directives and the provider's policy. Id. § 1396a(w) (1) (A). The
provider must also comply with its state's law regarding advance directives and must pro-
vide the patient with information about that state law. See id. § 1396a(w) (1) (D).
The U.S. Catholic Conference dropped its original opposition to PSDA after "the
mandate that each state enact an advance directive statute was removed and a committee
amendment was added to ensure that state conscience clause grounds would continue to
be valid." Larson & Eaton, supra, at 255. See also PSDA, § 1396a(w) (3) ("Nothing in this
section shall be construed to prohibit the application of a State law which allows for an
objection on the basis of conscience for any health care provider or any agent of such
provider which as a matter of conscience cannot implement an advance directive.").
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for them.8 2 The Maryland Catholic Conference also opposed Mary-
land's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act8 3 which predated MHCDA and
gave patients the right to provide for the refusal of life-sustaining pro-
cedures in their wills.8 4 Likewise, the New York State Catholic Confer-
ence opposed the New York Family Health Care Decisions Act.85 This
82. See Diane E. Hoffman, The Maryland Health Care Decisions Act: Achieving the Right
Balance?, 53 MD. L. REv. 1064, 1091-92 (1994). Senate Bill 664, the precursor to MHCDA,
"included a single advance directive form that would allow individuals either to appoint an
agent, leave instructions for receipt of health care or do both." Id. at 1089. The Maryland
Catholic Conference opposed the inclusion of patients who had "inevitably fatal condi-
tions" into Senate Bill 664's advance directive form. Id at 1091. The Conference main-
tained that "[a]cceptance of this concept, in [its] view, would embrace .. .the 'ethic of
euthanasia.' [The Conference believed that] [l]eaping to final decisions in the matters of
living will, durable power of attorney, and surrogate decisionmaking are perilous enough
.. .. Id. at 1091-92 (quoting Letter from Richard J. Dowling, The Maryland Catholic
Conference, to Hon. Stephen J. Braun, Chairman, Durable Power of Attorney Work
Group, House Environmental Matters Subcomm. and Subcomm. Members 7 (Mar. 16,
1993)). See also MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, supra note 55, at 1 (writing in response
to MHCDA and insinuating that MHCDA marks "the increasing tendency of our society to
devalue human life"). See also infra notes 102-16 (fully discussing MHCDA as it creates
patient rights to create advance directives and appoint surrogate decision-makers).
83. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 et seq. (1988 Supp.), repealed by MHCDA,
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 et seq. (1997).
84. See Wendy Ann Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Under Mayland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 MD. L.
REv. 1188, 1205-09 (1988). The Life-Sustaining Procedures Act (LSPA) allowed patients to
declare in their wills that "life-sustaining" procedures could be withheld or withdrawn. MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602 (1988 Supp.). The LSPA defined a "life-sustaining" pro-
cedure as one that "afford[s] a patient no reasonable expectation of recovery from a termi-
nal condition" and "would secure only a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life."
Id. at § 5-601 (e). However, the LSPA provided that "food and water" had to be adminis-
tered. Id. at § 5-602 (c). The LSPA did not define "food and water." See Kronmiller, supra,
at 1206. Therefore, the Society for the Right to Die encouraged patients to include decla-
rations to withhold or withdraw ANH because it believed ANH was different from "food
and water." See id. But see id. at 1207 (maintaining that the Environmental Matters Com-
mittee's report on the LSPA bill "indicates that the legislators meant to include AN&H
with 'food and water'").
Interestingly, the LSPA was only passed after the Maryland Catholic Conference
(MCC) relinquished its opposition to the bill. See id. MCC maintained that living wills
were not contrary to Church teaching, but it feared that the LSPA would "'crack open the
door to serious abuses affecting the sacredness of human life.'" Id. (quoting Richard Dow-
ling's, Executive Director of MCC, testimony on LSPA). MCC finally supported LSPA "in
part [because of] the 'strengthening' of the Act by its sponsors, who essentially had
adopted the Bishops' Committee guidelines." Id. at 1208. In particular, the LSPA's defini-
tion of "life-sustaining" procedure was "adopted verbatim" from a letter that Richard J.
Dowling sent to Delegate Larry Young, the Chairperson of the Environmental Matters
Committee. Id.
85. See Letter from John M. Kerry, New York State Catholic Conference, to Hon. Jo-
seph Lentol, Chairperson, Assembly Codes Comm. and Comm. Members (June 23, 1997)
in New York Catholic Conference, End of Life Decisionmaking, (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
<http://www.nyscatholicconference.org/budget/family.html> (discussing New York Fam-
ily Health Care Decisions Act). The Conference opposed the bill because "the Catholic
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law, which seeks to allow patients to appoint surrogate decision mak-
ers, was opposed because it did not distinguish ANH from other forms
of medical treatment. 86 Bishop and Catholic opposition to advance
directive legislation suggests that bishops generally oppose the with-
drawal or withholding of ANH; therefore, bishops will most likely fol-
low ERD 24 and prohibit those directives that are against Catholic
teaching.
3. NCCB's pro-ANH position
Although Catholic bishops and theologians have continually dis-
cussed and debated the Church's teaching on ANH,8 7 "Church teach-
ing . .. has not definitively resolved the question of the propriety of
withholding or withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration .... "88
Even though the Church's position on ANH may not be definitively
resolved, the NCCB, author of the ERDs, "opposes the increasingly
widespread practice of removing" ANH and advocates "'a presump-
tion' in favor of artificial feeding for people regarded to be perma-
nently unconscious."89  Given NCCB's pro-ANH position for
permanently unconscious patients, combined with Church and NCCB
pressure to follow the ERDs in general,9" bishops will most likely fol-
low ERD 24 and ignore patients' advance directives to the contrary.
In sum, the ambiguity of the Church's teaching on ANH, Catho-
lic opposition to withdrawing or withholding ANH and to advance di-
rective legislation, and NCCB's pro-ANH position pose grave
problems for patients who unknowingly enter a community hospital
which is actually part of a merged facility that follows the ERDs. Ar-
guably, patients seek health care knowing that they have the rights to
refuse unwanted medical treatment and create advance directives.
Church teaches that morally sound decisions concerning medical treatment for the inca-
pacitated need to be made by a community of the patient's family, health care providers
and religious and moral advisors. Therefore, in theory the concept of surrogate decision-
making is not contrary to Catholic teaching." Id. However, the Conference did oppose the
bill because it did not protect patients without surrogates, it did not distinguish ANH from
other medical treatment, it did not offer "higher decision-making standards" for "abortion,
sterilization, and treatment of pregnant patient[s] to the detriment of the unborn child,"
and it did not prohibit physician-assisted suicide. Id.
86. See id.
87. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
88. Asuili, supra note 53, at 57.
89. Religious News Service, Matters of Life or Death Are Also Questions of Ethics and Morals:
Comatose Patients: Catholic Bishops Come Out in Favor of Continued Artificial Feeding of People
Regarded to be Permanently Unconscious, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992, at B4.
90. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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When a merged facility disregards their rights, patients will lose access
to health care services to which they have legal rights to. 1
PART III. ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN PATIENTS' RIGHTS AND PROVIDERS' INTERESTS
Patients generally have the right to refuse medical treatment, in-
cluding artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).92 However, the
manner in which patients can choose to refuse such treatment varies
from state to state. 3 Physicians generally have statutory rights to ob-
ject to a patient's request to withdraw ANH on conscience clause
grounds; however, most states require physicians to notify the patient
of their decision not to honor the patient's request and to transfer the
patient to a provider that will honor the request.94 However, the
courts may find for patients when a merged provider refuses to honor
a patient's request to withdraw or withhold ANH. 5 The rights of pa-
tients to refuse ANH and create advance directives and health care
institutions' religious objections to their requests come into direct
conflict when a sectarian hospital merges with a non-sectarian hospi-
tal. This conflict can only be resolved after an examination of both
patients' rights and providers' interests.
A competent patient has a "constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."96 This liberty interest
includes a "constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition."97 In other words, artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion is a form of medical treatment which competent patients have the
right to refuse.98 Although all competent patients have a constitution-
ally protected right to refuse medical treatment, the procedures by
91. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 143-76 and accompanying text.
96. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). To arrive at this holding,
the Cruzan Court examined common-law doctrine and the Constitution. First, the Court
examined various state cases to conclude that the common-law doctrine of informed con-
sent encompasses a competent individual's right to refuse medical treatment. See id. at
278. Secondly, the Court reasoned that the constitutionally protected liberty interest to
refuse unwanted medical treatment could be inferred from its prior Fourteenth amend-
ment decisions. See id. at 278. A full discussion of Cruzan is outside the scope of this paper.
But see generally John Kenneth Giselson, Right to Die, Forced to Live: Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri
Department of Health, 7J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'x 401 (1991) (discussing Cruzan in
detail).
97. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
98. Cf supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 2:371388
1999] THE CATHOLIC MERGER CRUSADE
which they may decide to refuse medical treatment vary from state to
state.
All but three states have living will legislation.99 Through living
wills, patients can dictate their wishes regarding the withdrawal of
ANH and other life-sustaining treatments.1 °° Moreover, in every state,
health care legislation provides statutory rights for patients to appoint
a proxy or surrogate decision-maker to make health care decisions
according to their wishes when they become unable to do so for
themselves.101
For example, in 1993, the Maryland General Assembly passed and
the Governor 0 2 signed the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act
(MHCDA).1 °3 MHCDA allows patients to create written or oral ad-
vance directives"' and "authorizes surrogate decision-making for in-
competent individuals who did not appoint an agent when they were
capable of doing so."10 5 Furthermore, MHCDA regulates health care
99. See Hoffman, supra note 82, at 1066. Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York do
not have living will legislation. See id.
100. See supra note 23 (describing advance directives).
101. See Hoffman, supra note 82, at 1066-67 (listing Alabama as the only state that does
give its patients the right to appoint surrogate decision-makers). However, as of 1997,
Alabama's residents have the right to create advance directives. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 et
seq. (1997).
102. Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer signed the Maryland Health Care De-
cisions Act [hereinafter MHCDA] into law on May 12, 1993. See Hoffman, supra note 82, at
1066.
MHCDA was enacted in response to the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Mack
v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993), which held that an individual's preferences towards life-
sustaining treatment could not supersede statutory priority for appointing a guardian. See
Karen E. Goldmeier, Comment, The Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Na-
tional Trends and Recent Changes in Maryland, 53 MD. L. REv. 1306, 1307 (1994) (maintain-
ing that MHCDA was enacted in response to Mack). Prior to MHCDA, Maryland law
provided that a guardian could be appointed for an incompetent patient "according to the
following priorities: (1) a person ... nominated by the disabled person... ; (2) his spouse;
[or] (3) his parents.. . ." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-707(a) (1990 Supp.). Fur-
thermore, "among persons with equal priority," the court was enabled to "select the one
best qualified of those willing to serve. For good cause, the court [could] also pass over a
person with priority and appoint a person with lower priority." Id. § 13-707(c).
103. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601-618 (1997).
104. See id. § 5-602. "'Advance directive' means: (1) a witnessed written document, vol-
untarily executed by the declarant in accordance with the requirements of this subtitle; or
(2) a witnessed oral statement, made by the declarant in accordance with the provisions of
this subtitle." Id. § 5-601 (b) (1)-(2).
105. Goldmeier, supra note 102, at 1335 (citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
605(a) (2) (1994)). See also infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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provider"°6 behavior with regard to advanced directives and sets forth
penalties for physicians1 0 7 who do not comply with the Act.10' 8
First, MHCDA authorizes competent individuals' 9 to create ad-
vance directives "regarding the provision of health care to that indi-
vidual, or the withholding or withdrawal of health care from that
individual."" 0 MHCDA also gives competent patients the right to ap-
point agents to make their health care decisions for them at the point
they become incompetent."' A health care provider can never be
appointed as an agent by a patient unless the health care provider is
also the patient's guardian, spouse, adult child, parent, adult brother
or sister, or friend or relative." 2
When a competent patient becomes "incapable of making an in-
formed decision," her advance directive regarding treatment or
agency becomes effective." 3 Accordingly, patients have the responsi-
bility under MHCDA to notify the attending providers of their direc-
106. MHCDA defines "health care provider" as "a health care practitioner or a facility
that provides health care to individuals." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(k) (1)
(1997). "Health care provider" also "includes agents or employees of a health care practi-
tioner or a facility that provides health care to individuals." Id. § 5-601 (k) (2).
107. MHCDA defines "physician" as "a person licensed to practice medicine in the State
or in the jurisdiction where the treatment is to be rendered or withheld." MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (p).
108. See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
109. MHCDA defines a "competent individual" as "a person who is at least 18 years of
age and.., has the same capacity as an adult to consent to medical treatment and who has
not been determined to be incapable of making an informed decision." MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (f). See also infra note 113 (providing MHCDA's definition of "incapa-
ble of making an informed decision").
110. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(a). A written advanced directive must be
"dated, signed by or at the express direction of the declarant, and subscribed by two wit-
nesses." Id. § 5-602(c). In addition, MHCDA provides that a competent person may also
make her advanced directive orally. See id. § 5-602(d). "An oral advance directive shall
have the same effect as a written advance directive if made in the presence of the attending
physician and one witness and documented as part of the individual's medical record. The
documentation shall be dated and signed by the attending physician and the witness." Id.
§ 5-602(c).
111. See id. § 5-602 (b) (written); Id. § 5-602 (d) (orally). An agent appointed by a written
advanced directive has priority over any surrogate decision maker appointed by MHCDA's
priority provision. See id. § 5-605(a) (2).
112. See id. § 5-602(b)(2). See also infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (providing
the statutory requirements for friend or relative to act as agent).
113. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(e)(1). A patient is "incapable of making
an informed decision" when s/he has
an inability.., to make an informed decision about the provision, with-holding,
or withdrawal of a specific medical treatment or course of treat-ment because the
patient is unable to understand the nature, extent, or probable consequences of
the proposed treatment or course of treatment, is unable to make a rational eval-
uation or the burdens, risks, and benefits or the treatment or course of treatment,
or is unable to communicate a decision.
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tives." 4 If a patient has not appointed an agent before s/he becomes
incompetent, a "surrogate decision maker" will be appointed for her
according to a prioritized list.115 The surrogate-decisionmaker may
be, in descending order of priority, the patient's guardian, spouse,
adult child, parent, adult brother or sister, friend, or other relative.1" 6
If a surrogate decision maker is called upon to make health care deci-
sions for a patient and s/he does not know the patient's wishes regard-
ing treatment, s/he must decide according to the patient's best
interest. 1 1
7
In addition to creating patient rights regarding advance directives
and surrogate decision-making, MHCDA recognizes health care prov-
iders' interests in following patient directives and provides penalties
for those who violate the Act. First, a health care provider who "will-
fully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliterate, or damages" a patient's ad-
vance directive or who "falsifies or forges a revocation of the
[patient's] advance directive" is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be
fined up to $10,000 and/or imprisoned for up to one year.' i Sec-
ondly, MHCDA does not require a physician to prescribe or render
medical treatment that s/he believes is "ethically inappropriate."11 9
Id. § 5-601 (1) (1). A patient is not classified as "incapable of making an informed decision"
under MHCDA simply because s/he is not able to communicate by speech. Id. § 5-
601 (1) (2).
114. See id. § 5-602(f)(1). However, if the patient is "comatose, incompetent, or other-
wise incapable of communication" any one else can notify the physician of the patient's
directive. Id.
115. Id. § 5-605(a) (2). A surrogate decision maker can also make decisions for a patient
if the health care provider is unaware of or cannot locate the patient's agent after a reason-
able inquiry, if the agent does not respond in a timely manner, or if the agent is incapaci-
tated or unwilling to make decisions for the patient. See id. § 5-605(a) (1) (i)-(v).
116. See id. § 5-605(a)(2). A friend or relative can only be a surrogate decision maker
for the patient if s/he is competent and if s/he admits by affidavit that s/he has "main-
tained regular contact with the patient sufficient to be familiar with the patient's activities,
health, and personal beliefs." Id. § 5-605(a) (3).
117. See id. § 5-605(c)(1). To determine the patient's best interest, MHCDA instructs
the surrogate decision maker to consider
the patient's [c]urrent diagnosis and prognosis with and without the treatment at
issue; [e]xpressed preferences regarding the provision of, or the withholding or
withdrawal of, the specific treatment at issue or of similar treatments; [r]elevant
religious and moral beliefs and personal values; behavior, attitudes, and past con-
duct with respect to the treatment at issue and medical treatment generally;
[r]eactions to the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, a similar
treatment for another individual; and [e]xpressed concerns about the effect on
the family or intimate friends of the patient if a treatment were provided, with-
held, or withdrawn.
Id. § 5-605(c) (2) (i)-(vi) (emphasis added).
118. See id. § 5-610(a).
119. Id. § 5-611(a). MHCDA does not define "ethically inappropriate." Id. § 5-601.
Even if a provider objects to a patient's advance directive or surrogate's instruction, that
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However, a health care provider must "make every reasonable effort
to transfer" a patient if the health care provider does not wish to fol-
low the patient's directive and the agent or surrogate decision maker
requests a transfer.
1 20
In some contexts, physicians may object to procedures that pa-
tients otherwise have rights to. As they currently exist in federal and
state statutory law, conscience clauses allow health care providers to
object to performing abortions and related services on moral or reli-
gious grounds. 12 1 Increasingly, living will legislation provides con-
science clause rights to physicians so they may object to advance
directives on moral, ethical, or religious grounds; however, physicians
are generally required to inform and transfer the patient. 122 Further-
more, some conscience clause statutes include only physicians while
others include physicians and hospitals.
123
First, the federal "Church Amendment" permits health care prov-
iders 124 and physicians to refuse to provide or participate in the provi-
sion of abortions and sterilizations on religious or moral grounds.
125
Although the Church Amendment provides physicians and health
care providers with a right of religious or moral conscience, this right
provider must prescribe or render the treatment while the patient is awaiting transfer if
failure to comply with that instruction would likely result in the death of the individual. See
id. § 5-613(a) (3).
120. Id. § 5-613(a) (1) (iii). However, the provider must comply with the instruction un-
til the transfer is effectuated if the failure to comply would likely result in the patient's
death. See id. § 5-613(a)(3). The provider is only required to transfer if the agent or
surrogate decision-maker requests it. See id. § 5-613(a) (1) (ii).
121. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J.
LEGAL MED. 177, 179-80 (1993).
122. See KING, supra note 23, at 153.
123. See id. at 182.
124. The "Church Amendment" only covers those providers who receive a "grant, con-
tract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 201 et
seq.], the Community Mental Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 2689 et seq.] or the Devel-
opmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6000 et seq.]."
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (1991).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7. The "Church Amendment" prevents public officials and
public authorities from requiring individual providers to "perform or assist in the perform-
ance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the
performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or
moral convictions." Id. § 300a-7(b) (1). Furthermore, the "Church Amendment" provides
that public officials and public authorities may not require an "entity" to "make its facilities
available for the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion" if doing so is
against the "religious beliefs or moral convictions" of the entity. Id. §300a-7(b) (2) (A). En-
tities do not have to "provide any personnel for the performance or assistance in the per-
formance of any sterilization procedure or abortion" either. Id. § 300a-7(b) (2) (B).
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may only be exercised in the context of abortions and sterilizations. t26
In other words, the federal conscience clause right does not extend to
withdrawing or withholding ANH.
Similarly, state law often allows providers conscience rights to re-
productive health care as well.' 27 For example, Maryland law allows
providers, identified as persons, hospitals, hospital directors, or hospi-
tal governing boards,1 28 to object to performing or participating in
the provision of abortions, sterilizations, or artificial inseminations. 129
Maryland's "conscience clause" statute does not identify the basis
upon which providers can object to the included procedures. 130 How-
ever, since the Maryland statute closely mirrors the Church Amend-
ment, it seems likely that the objection would need to be based on
religious or moral conviction. Nonetheless, the Maryland statute, like
the Church Amendment, is restricted to reproductive health services
only.13 1
However, nearly every state has included conscience clause rights
to object to end-of-life treatment in its living will legislation.' 3 2 Some
126. See id. § 300a-7. The Church Amendment is limited to abortions and sterilizations
because the Amendment was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade, which held that women have a fundamental constitutional right to abortion. See
Wardle, supra note 121, at 180-81. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
127. See Wardle, supra note 121, at 179-80.
128. SeeMD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (a)(1) & (b)(1) (1991 Supp.). The stat-
ute does not limit coverage to a particular receipt of state or federal funding, contract, or
grant. See generally id.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing Church Amendment's
limitations).
132. See generally, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.);
ArAsKA STAT. § 18.12.050 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 2nd Spec. Sess.); A~iz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3205 (West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 2nd Reg. Sess. and 5"' Spec.
Sess.); Apt. CODE ANN., § 20-17-207 (WESTLAW through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West, WESTLAW through End of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1"t
Ex. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-113 (West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 2nd
Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a (West, WESTLAW through End of 1997 4'
Sp. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508 (WESTIAW through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427 (WESTLAW through Laws 12-1 to 12-104, 12-113, 12-114, 12-125
to 12-127, and Act 12-138 of the 1997-98 12"' District Council Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.308 (West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 2nd Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8
(WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327D-11 (LEXIS,
WESTLAW through the 1998 Reg. Sess. of the Nineteenth Legis.); IDAHO CODE § 39-4508
(LEXIS, WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/35
(West, WESTLAW through P.A. 90-609, apv. 6/30/1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13
(West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 2"" Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.8 (West,
WESTLAW through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107 (WESTLAW
through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.633 (Baldwin, WESTLAW
through End of 1997 1" Ex. Sess.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.7 (West, WESTLAW
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living will conscience clauses affirmatively require the physician to no-
tify the patient that s/he will not honor the patient's directive. 133 Fur-
thermore, if a physician refuses to honor a patient's advance directive,
the conscience clauses generally require the physician to transfer or
assist in the transfer of the patient to a physician or provider that will
honor the patient's directive. 134 While nearly every living will con-
through End of all 1997 Reg. Sess. Acts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-809 (West,
WESTLAW through End of 1997 2nd Sp. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613
(LEXIS, WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 201D, § 14
(West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 2n" Annual Sess., Ch. 203 appr. 7/31/1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West, WESTLAW through End of 1998 1 Sp. Sess.); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-215 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.830,
459.030 (Vernon, WESTLAW through End of 1997 2n' Ex. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-
203 (WESTLAW through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3428 (WESTLAW
through End of 1998 V Sp. Sess.); NEV. REv. STAT. § 449.628 (WESTLAW through 1997
Reg. Sess., adj. July 7, 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:6, 137-J:1, 137-J:8 (WESTLAW
through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 26:2H-62, 26:2H-65 (West, WESTLAW
through L.1998 c.107); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 1" Sp.
Sess.); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2984 (McKinney, WESTLAW through the Laws of 1998,
Chapters 1, 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 49, 51, 52, 59 to 76, 79 to 124, 126 to 150, 152 to 167, 169, 171 to
200, 202 to 212, 214, 216 to 218, 220, 222 to 279, 281 to 354, 356 to 371, 373 to 380, 382 to
424, 426 to 546, 548 to 561, 563 to 566, 568 to 588 and 591 of 221t Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-08, 23-06.5-09 (Michie, WESTLAW through End of 1997 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 1337.16, 2133.10 (Baldwin, WESTLAW through 1998 portion of 1 2 2 d G.A.,
Files 1 to 187, apv. 7/1/1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9 (West, WESTLAW
through End of 1998 1St Ex. Sess.); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.625 (WESTLAW through End of
1997 Reg. Sess.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5409 (Purdon, WESTLAW through Act 1998-48);
RI. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-6 (LEXIS, WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-77-100 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
12D-11 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-108, 34-6-
214 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (LEXIS,
WESTLAW through End of 1998 Gen. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3459 (WESTLAW
through End of 1997 Adj. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 (Michie, WESTLAW through
End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (West, WESTLAW through
End of 1998 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7 (LEXIS, WESTLAW through End of 1998
1V Ex. Sess.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Act 338, published
7/3/1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-104 (WESTLAW through End of 1998 Reg. Sess.).
133. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.12.050(b): ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2 5 08(g)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8 (b);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a) (1); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145B.06(a); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(7) (a); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-62(b);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(g)(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(2); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.625(2) (a); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5409(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3459(b).
134. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (reasonably cooperate or assist in transfer); ALAsKA
STAT. § 18.12.050(a ) ("take all reasonable steps to transfer"); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-
3205(C)(1) (transfer); ARR. CODE ANN. § 20-17-207 ("take all reasonable steps to trans-
fer"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 ("take all reasonable steps to transfer"); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-113(5) (transfer); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a ("take all
reasonable steps to transfer"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508(g) (3) ("shall not impede the
transfer"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(b) ("effect the transfer"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.308(1) ("shall make reasonable efforts to transfer"); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (1)-
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science clause statute covers physicians, some cover providers and fa-
cilities as well.13 5  Furthermore, a few of the conscience clauses
(2) (attempt or permit transfer if next of kin or legal guardian so requests); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 327D-11(b) ("make the necessary arrangements to effect the transfer");
IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (assist in obtaining other care); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/35
(assist); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-13(e) (transfer); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.8(1) ("take all
reasonable steps to effect the transfer"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,107(a) (transfer); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2) (shall not impede the transfer and must supply medical records if
patient, family, or guardian requests transfer); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.7(B) ("make
a reasonable effort to transfer"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-809; MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a)(2) (assist); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 14 (transfer);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (no duty to transfer); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(7)(c)
("make all reasonable efforts to assist in the transfer" unless patient refuses assistance);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.030 ("shall not impede" the transfer); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203
("take all reasonable steps to transfer"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3428(1) (may transfer); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 449.628 ("shall take all reasonable steps as promptly as practicable to trans-
fer"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:6(II) ("make the necessary arrangements to effect the
transfer"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-62(b) ("effect an appropriate, respectful and timely
transfer"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(G) (3) ("immediately make all reasonable efforts to
assist in the transfer" unless patient refuses assistance); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2984(3) (b) (transfer); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-08 ("take . . .all reasonable steps to
transfer"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1337.16(B) (2) (a) ("shall not prevent or attempt to pre-
vent, or unreasonably delay or attempt to unreasonably delay, the transfer"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9 ("take all reasonable steps to arrange" other care); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 127.625(c) ("make a reasonable effort to transfer"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5409(a)
("make every reasonable effort to assist in the transfer"); RI. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-6 ("shall
make the necessary arrangements to effect the transfer"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100
("shall make a reasonable effort to locate a physician or health care facility that will effectu-
ate the [advance directive] and has a duty to transfer the patient to that physician or facil-
ity"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-12D-11 ("shall make a reasonable effort to locate and to
transfer the [patient] to a physician or health-care provider willing to honor the [advance
directive]"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) ("make every reasonable effort to assist in the
transfer" at patient's request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3459(b) ("actively assist in selecting
another health care provider or physician who is willing to honor the agent's directive");
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2987 ("shall make a reasonable effort to transfer"); W. VA. CODE § 16-
30-7(b) ("effect the transfer"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(a)(3) (failure or refusal to
"make a good faith effort" to transfer will constitute unprofessional conduct); Wvo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-22-104(b) ("attempt to effect the transfer").
135. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-8(a) (including health care providers); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.050(b) (including health care facilities with regard to do-not-resuscitate orders);
Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205 (including providers); AR& CODE ANN. § 20-17-207 (in-
cluding providers); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (including providers); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-580a (including providers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508 (including
providers and facilities); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2427(a) (including health facilities); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.308(1) (including facilities); IDAHo CODE § 39-4508 (including facilities);
755 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 40/35 (including facilities); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.8 (includ-
ing providers); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(2) (including facilities); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299.58.7(D) (including providers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-809(a) (including
institutions); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a) (including providers); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145B.06(a) (including providers); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(6) (including insti-
tutions); Mo. ANNm. STAT. § 404.830(2) (including hospitals and other health care facili-
ties); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 (including providers); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3428(1)
(including organizations); NEv. REv. STAT. § 449.628 (including providers); N.H. REv.
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specifically recognize the ability of health care institutions to create
religious or morally motivated policies against ANH withdrawal or
withholding; however, these clauses generally require the institution
to inform the patient of its policy as soon as possible. 136
STAT. ANN. § 137-J:8(2) (including health providers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-65 (includ-
ing institutions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7 (including providers); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2984(3) (including private hospitals); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-08, 23-06.5-09 (includ-
ing providers); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.16, 2133.10 (including health care facilities);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.9 (including providers); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.625 (includ-
ing providers); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5409 (including providers); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-
4.10-6 (including providers); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 (including facilities); S.D. ConI-
FIED LAws § 34-12D-11 (including providers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (including
other providers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3459 (including providers and all provider em-
ployees); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.060 (including facilities); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7
(including providers and all provider employees); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07 (including in-
patient health care facilities).
136. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508(f) ("A health-care institution may decline to
comply with an [advance directive] if the [advance directive] is contrary to a written policy
of the institution which is based on reasons of conscience and if the policy was communi-
cated to the patient or [the patient's surrogate]."); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/35 ("If
the policies of a health care facility preclude compliance with a decision to forgo life-
sustaining treatment, the facility shall take all reasonable steps to assist the patient.., in
effectuating [transfer to a facility that will honor the directive]."); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.8(2) ("If the policies of a health care provider preclude compliance with [an ad-
vance directive] .... the provider shall take all reasonable steps to effect the transfer of the
patient to [a facility that will honor the directive]."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.7(D)
("If the policies of a health care provider preclude compliance with [an advance directive]
.... then the provider shall take all reasonable steps to transfer the patient to a provider
[that will honor the advance directive]."); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-215(5) ("A health-care
institution may decline to comply with an [advance directive] if [it] is contrary to a policy
of the institution which is expressly based on reasons of conscience and if the policy was
timely communicated to the patient [or her/his agent]."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.830(2)
("No [facility] shall be required to honor a[n advance directive] if [it] is contrary to the...
facility's institutional policy based on religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions
unless the ... facility received a copy of ihe [advance directive] prior to commencing the
current series of treatments or current confinement."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-203 ("If
the policies of a health care facility preclude compliance with [an advance directive], that
facility shall take all reasonable steps to transfer the patient to a facility in which the [ad-
vance directive] can be carried out."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3428(1) (A provider is not
obligated to -honor an advance directive if it "is contrary to [the provider's] formally
adopted policy ... that is expressly based on the religious beliefs or sincerely held ethical
or moral convictions central to the operating principles of the [provider]." The provider
may refuse to honor the advance directive only if the provider "informed the [patient] of
such policy, if [it was] reasonably possible."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(E) ("A health-care
institution may decline to comply with an [advance directive] if [it] is contrary to a policy
of the health-care institution that is expressly based on reasons of conscience and if the
policy was timely communicated to the patient."); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2984(3) (A
provider is not required to honor an advance directive that "is contrary to a formally
adopted policy of the hospital that is expressly based on the religious beliefs or sincerely
held moral convictions central to the facility's operating principles .... provided: the
hospital has informed the patient.., of such policy prior to or upon admission, if reason-
ably possible; and the patient is transferred promptly to another hospital that is reasonably
[VOL. 2:371
THE CATHOLIC MERGER CRUSADE
In the Catholic/non-sectarian merger context, a provider con-
science clause right to object to advance directives is highly problem-
atic. If the merged facility is the only health care provider in the
patient's area, s/he will have to forego her/his advance directive
rights in order to be admitted to that facility or travel to a hospital that
will honor her advance directive.' 37 Moreover, transfer may place un-
due hardship on the patient. 138 A merged facility that follows the
ERDs presents patients with a horrible choice; either they must forego
their rights to refuse treatment or they must travel to or be transferred
to a foreign hospital. 139 Unlike the situation where a patient chooses
to enter a Catholic hospital which s/he knows or should know will not
honor her/his directive against ANH, the patient who enters a
merged facility may not know or have reason to suspect that her/his
directive will not be honored. 140
Some living will statutes require providers to notify patients of
their policies against withholding or withdrawing ANH. 4 If a patient
enters the merged facility post-merger, s/he should receive notice of
the anti-withholding/withdrawing policy upon admission if the hospi-
tal abides by the statute. However, some patients will likely be in the
non-sectarian hospital before merger. If the -hospital is forced to
adopt the sectarian hospital's anti-withholding/withdrawing policy
upon merger, notification after the fact will do little good. At this
point, the patient has already entered the hospital expecting that her/
his advance directive will be followed. Now, s/he must either forego
her/his advance directive or transfer to a different facility. Further-
accessible under the circumstances and is willing to honor the [advance directive]."); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 5409(a) (" . . . [Ihf the policies of the health care provider preclude
compliance with [an advance directive], the... provider shall so inform the [patient].").
New Jersey law requires health care institutions to adopt policies concerning advance
directives and provide them to interested patients and families. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2H-65(2). In addition, health care institutions must develop policies to inform their
staff of the policies. See id. § 26:2H-65(6). Finally,
[a] private, religiously-affiliated health care institution may develop institutional
policies and practices defining circumstances in which it will decline to partici-
pate in the withholding or withdrawing of specified measures utilized to sustain
life. Such policies and practices shall be written, and shall be properly communi-
cated to patients and their families and health care representatives prior to or
upon the patient's admission, or as soon after admission as is practicable.
Id. § 26:2H-65(6) (b).
137. See, e.g., supra note 20 (providing an example of one patient's dilemma).
138. See, e.g., supra note 20 (providing an example of the undue hardship imposed).
139. See, e.g., supra note 20 (providing an example of the choice a patient must make).
Because the merged facility may be the only provider in the area, the patient may have to
travel great distance.
140. See, e.g., infra notes 143-87 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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more, if a merger severely or completely eliminates provider choice in
the patient's area, the patient will have no choice but to forego her/
his advance directive or travel to another hospital. However, the one
case addressing this type of policy in a Catholic/non-sectarian merged
facility, found for the patient and ordered the hospital to withhold
ANH from the patient according to her request.14 2
In February, 1985, Beverly Requena was diagnosed with amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). 14 Mrs. Requena entered Riverside
Hospital in Boonton, New Jersey on April 4, 1985.1' A few months
later, Riverside Hospital merged with St. Clare's Hospital, and "the
Roman Catholic religious order of sisters which controlled St. Clare's
... ended up as the controlling force of the new [merged] entity.
' 145
At some point after her admittance to Riverside, after Riverside
became St. Clare's/Riverside Medical Center (hereinafter Hospital),
Mrs. Requena began to lose her ability to swallow.146 As Mrs. Requena
began to lose her ability to swallow and eat normally, she notified the
Hospital that "she [would] refuse to accept feeding by a nasogastric
tube 147 or other artificial device. "14' The Hospital immediately in-
formed Mrs. Requena that her decision "conflicted with its 'pro-life'
values."149  The Hospital's board of trustees had "unanimously
adopted" an anti-ANH withholding policy on September, 11, 1986.150
142. See In reRequena, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), affg 517 A.2d 886
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
143. See Requena, 517 A.2d at 887. The court defined ALS as
a disease which involves degeneration and hardening of portions of the spinal
cord. It is characterized by progressive loss of control of the muscles of the body
and by increasing paralysis. There is no cure for the disease. Its course is relent-
less. Death within a few years of onset is the inevitable result of ALS. Although
the victim progressively loses the ability to control bodily movements and func-




146. At the time of trial, Mrs. Requena could not eat normally; however, she had "some
limited ability to suck in nutrient fluids through a straw." Id. at 888. The trial court noted
that the limited ability to suck nutrients through a straw would "soon be entirely gone." Id.
147. A nasogastric tube is a soft rubber or plastic tube that is inserted through the nose
into the stomach and is used to instill liquid food or water. See MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA & DICrIoNARY OF MED., NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 983 (5th ed. 1992).
148. Requena, 517 A.2d at 887. Mrs. Requena made her decision and notified the Hospi-
tal on or before July 15, 1986 because her decision "was first communicated to the Hospi-
tal's management" on that day. Id. at 888.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 889. The policy stated:
BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Trustees that it does hereby reaffirm the policy
of the former St. Clare's Hospital that food and water are basic human needs and
that such fundamental care cannot be withheld from patients in the Medical
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When the Hospital could not dissuade Mrs. Requena of her request, it
"offered to assist her in transferring to another institution" that would
honor her request.'
The Hospital most likely offered to assist Mrs. Requena's transfer
because it believed that its "strong institutional policy'' 5 2 against with-
holding ANH outweighed Mrs. Requena's right to decline ANH.' 53
Another hospital' was willing to accept Mrs. Requena and honor her
request to withhold ANH.' 5 The other hospital could have provided
"supportive and compassionate" care. 15 6 Mrs. Requena could have
been "safe[ly] transport[ed]" to that hospital.'5 7 Moreover, one of
Mrs. Requena's treating physicians at the Hospital would have contin-
ued as her treating physician at the new hospital. 158 Although the
transfer seemed to be the "ideal solution,"159 the court chose not to
transfer Mrs. Requena for several reasons. 160
First, Mrs. Requena did not want to leave the Hospital because
she had received "professionally good and personally compassionate"
care during her stay. 6 ' Secondly, she trusted and liked the nurses
and staff at the Hospital and was "familiar with the physical surround-
ings."' 6 2 Finally, the transfer would have been "emotionally and psy-
chologically upsetting" and would have involved "significant elements
of rejection and casting out.""' For these reasons, the court ordered
that Mrs. Requena could not be transferred and could stay at the Hos-
Center and that neither the Medical Center nor personnel will participate in the
withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding. and/or fluids.
Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 887.
153. See id. at 889 ("While asserting its own policy, the Hospital has readily recognized
the right of Beverly Requena to decline artificial feeding.").
154. The other hospital, St. Barnabas, had facilities and treatment skills that were equal
to the Hospital. See id.
155. See id. The hospital that agreed to accept Mrs. Requena and honor her wish, St.




159. Id. ("It would fully respect both the patient's desire not to be fed artificially and the
Hospital's desire not to participate in the withholding of such feeding. It would also pro-
vide good medical care for the patient during the final stages of her illness.").
160. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
161. Requena, 517 A.2d at 889.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court explained that if Mrs. Requena were transferred "she [would] experi-
ence extra suffering over and above the grim suffering necessarily inherent in her disease
and in her choice of no artificial feeding." Id. at 890.
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pital until her death, and the Hospital could not administer artificial
feeding against her will at the point it would become necessary. 164
Aside from ruling that the Hospital must honor Mrs. Requena's
request to withhold ANH, the court, in dicta, discussed the Hospital's
policy.165 Although the court suspected the Hospital would criticize
its decision,166 the court believed that the patient's legal and moral
right to "decide for herself" must prevail. 167 The court believed that
the key moral and legal value involved in this case [was] the
personal worth, dignity and integrity of the individual
human being who happens to be a patient. The right to
make informed, autonomous decisions about one's own
treatment is a crucial part of that personal worth, dignity and
integrity. In the context of this case, this means that Beverly
Requena, and she alone, has the right to decide what treat-
ment she will receive. Health care providers must assist her
in making her decision by supplying her with information
about her condition, her prognosis, her treatment alterna-
tives. They may and should counsel her and caution her
with respect to her decision. But in the end, the decision must
be hers alone and it must be uncoerced.168
Although the court recognized that the Hospital did not intend its
policy to interfere with Mrs. Requena's right to decide for herself, it
found the "policy [to be], in fact, coercive. "69
In addition to- being coercive, the court opined, in dicta, that the
Hospital was also being judgmental."7 ° The court was "somewhat con-
cerned that there [was] a completely unintended but real moral rejec-
tion of Mrs. Requena as a person by the Hospital ....
... [It is], in effect, telling this poor woman that it is wrong for her
not to accept more suffering.' 171 "In the final analysis," the court
164. See id.
165. See id. at 890-93.
166. See id. at 891. Despite the suspected criticism, the court maintained its "respect and
admir[ation of] the work, the motivation and the general values of the Hospital and its
personnel." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. The court also opined that the Hospital had tended to turn the case into a
"'pro-life' versus 'anti-life' issue where one [did] not truly exist." Id. at 891. Furthermore,
the court maintained that "part of the Hospital's insistence on what it perceives as a pro-
life position in this case is a mistaken fall-out from the abortion controversy which is on-
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opined, "it is fairer to ask [the Hospital] to give than it is to ask Bev-
erly Requena to give." 72
The Appellate Superior Court agreed with the lower court's final
analysis, but it apparently disagreed with the trial court's dicta regard-
ing the Hospital's policy.' 73 The Appellate Court found that the trial
court had not invalidated the Hospital's policy but rather had made a
fact specific finding that Mrs. Requena's request be honored.174 The
Appellate Court "construe[d] the [Hospital's] policy as valid and en-
forceable only if it does not conflict with a patient's right to die deci-
sion and other protected interests." '175 The Hospital was free to apply
its policy but only in "circumstances where it is reasonable and equita-
ble to apply it without undue burden to the patient."1 76
172. Id. at 893. The court also suggested that if the Hospital and staff would just "re-
think[ ] more carefully their own attitudes, the health care workers at the Hospital might
find it possible to be more fully accepting and supportive of Mrs. Requena's decision." Id.
Just in case reflection did not work, the court called upon the staff and Hospital, "as they
turn[ed] with loving compassion to the work of helping Beverly Requena, to recall the
beautiful words of Jesus: 'Come to me, all you who are wearyand find life burdensome,
and I will refresh you.'" Id. (citing the Bible at Matthew 11:28).
173. See id. at 870.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. In fact, the Appellate Court found that the policy could only be valid when the
Hospital "present[ed] a reasonably convenient and suitable alternative health care facility
which [would] reasonably comply with the patient's decision." Id. The Appellate Court
upheld the trial court's fact specific determination that the alternative in Mrs. Requena's
case was not "reasonably convenient [or] suitable." Id.
At least one Catholic commentator believes In re Requena is an anomaly; "[a]lthough a
Catholic health care institution has legitimate reason to be concerned over what it may
perceive as judicial officiousness, the Requena decision should be viewed as a limited excep-
tion to otherwise judicial reluctance to interfere with hospital policy decisions." Ausili,
supra note 53, at 77 n.85. Ausili believes the key issue in Requena was the Hospital's failure
to notify the patient of its policy before she decided she wanted to withhold ANH. See id.
Therefore, Ausili believes that a court would be less likely to find in favor of the patient if
the hospital provided the patient with adequate notice of its policy. See id. Furthermore,
for patients who enter the hospital unconscious, the hospital will not have to fear the court
will find for the patient because of the patient's attachment to the hospital as it did in
Requena. See id. This "advice" runs precariously close to the coercion Judge Stanton dis-
cussed in Requena. See In re Requena, 517 A.2d at 891. See also supra notes 168-69 and accom-
panying text (discussing Judge Stanton's dicta about coercion).
Ausili's issue about notice raises another concern. Under PSDA, hospitals that receive
federal monies are required to maintain policies regarding advance directives and provide
patients with information about their policies and state law regarding advance directives.
See Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(w) (1) (1991). See also supra note 81
(discussing PSDA). The PSDA, then, appears to mandate that a hospital give its patients
notice of its advance directive policies. Although outside the scope of this note, it would
be interesting to consider why the courts have not used the PSDA as a remedy and why
Catholic hospitals apparently are not following its mandate.
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In re Requena is not an isolated example of a Catholic/non-sectar-
ian merged facility's choice to deny a patient's request regarding ANH
withholding or withdrawal. For example, a Catholic hospital recently
merged with a secular hospital in Cumberland, MD. 77 After the two
hospitals merged, Grace Light wanted to remove her adult daughter
from ANH.' 78 Her daughter had been on ANH in the secular hospital
for fifteen months pre-merger because of a heart attack that left her in
a permanent vegetative state. 79 However, the management of the
merged facility required Ms. Light to attend an ethics committee
meeting to determine whether or not her request to withdraw her
daughter's ANH could be honored."'
As Ms. Light entered the meeting, she found a copy of the ERDs
on the table in front of her.18 ' "It took Light 15 minutes to persuade
the committee to let her daughter be removed from feeding tubes."' 82
Although Ms. Light was able to convince the committee to honor her
request relatively quickly, she was angered by the hospital's policy; she
said, "It was none of their business. ... They should have stayed over
at [the Catholic hospital.]"18 3 Regardless of how quickly Ms. Light was
able to convince the committee, no patient or surrogate should have
to defend their decision to someone else's moral or religious
judgment.
In re Requena suggests that courts may not be willing to honor
providers' conscience clause rights under living will statutes if provid-
ers wait to notify patients post-merger. However, the disagreement
between the trial court and appellate court as to the hospital's policy
could prove problematic in the Catholic/non-sectarian merger con-
text. Although outside the scope of this paper, the issue of whether or
not Catholic hospitals have a religious right to maintain their ERD-
based policies post-merger needs to be examined.
IV. CONCLUSION
The "evidence" contained in this paper, suggests that if Catholic
hospitals continue to merge with non-sectarian ones and continue to
force ERD compliance from the non-sectarian hospitals, patients'
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rights will be severely jeopardized.'8 4 Patients' advance directives are
being called into question nearly every day in merged hospitals
around the country.85 Patients may find themselves forced into a sit-
uation where they must either choose to forego their advance direc-
tive rights or travel or be transferred to another hospital. Even more
devastating, when a Catholic hospital merges with a non-sectarian hos-
pital in a rural or sparsely populated area, a patient's choice of pro-
vider, and therefore her religious freedom, are eradicated because
she simply has nowhere else to go. Ironically, the Catholic Church
advocates against this type of religious coercion.'8 6
As a result, many non-Catholic clergy have begun to voice their
opposition to the Catholic/non-sectarian merger movement.'87 Un-
doubtedly, the merger of Catholic and non-sectarian hospitals will
continue to eradicate non-Catholic patients' abilities to exercise their
rights to refuse medical treatment and make advance directives ac-
cording to their own religious or moral beliefs.
184. Patients depend on their rights to create advance directives. Recently, a study was
conducted to "identify and describe elements of quality end-of-life care from the patient's
perspective." Peter A. Singer et al., Quality End-of-Life Care: Patients' Perspectives, 281 JAMA
163 (1999). The study found that patients "were afraid of 'lingering' and 'being kept alive'
after they no longer could enjoy their lives." Id. at 165. "[The study's participants] ada-
mantly denounced 'being kept alive by a machine.'" Id. One study participant said, "'I
wouldn't want life supports if I'm going to die anyway.'" Id. Therefore, it appears that
patients do not want their rights to create advance directives jeopardized or eliminated.
185. See, e.g., supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
186. See Christopher T. Carlson, Church and State: Consistency of the Catholic Church's Social
Teaching, 35 CATH. LAw. 339, 351 (1992). However, "'traditional Catholic doctrine [states
that there is] one true religion and.., one Church of Christ.'" Id. (quoting DECLARATION
ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM). "[The Declaration on Religious Freedom] expressed opposition
to coercion by individuals or a state which would force a person to embrace a particular
religion." Id.
187. See, e.g., Maryland Merger Monitor, Advertisement, The Community Wants a Full
Range of Services, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 1998, at H6 (providing sixty-three signatures of non-
Catholic clergy who believe that "the imposition of sectarian Ethical and Religious Direc-
tives upon people of other faiths is just not right"); Don't Impose Religious Rules on Our Non-
religious Hospitals, DAILY FREEMAN-KINGSTON, NY, Feb. 6, 1998, at 10 (providing list of
clergy who oppose the imposition of religious rules on non-religious hospitals).
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